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In recent years, the inner workings of many intelligent agents have become opaque to
users who wish to manage or collaborate with them. This lack of transparency makes
it difficult for human users to understand and predict the behavior of such agents.
We argue that computational agents that store the plans they construct can behave in a
predictable and transparent manner by remembering the plans used for achieving goals
and explaining their contents to users.
To investigate this issue, we present a psychologically inspired computational theory
of episodic memory that explains how intelligent agents can use their personal experi-
ence to make known their internal decision-making process. We augment this theory
with an implementation and show how systems with episodic memory capabilities
can explain what happened in their personal past. We demonstrate this system’s abil-
ity to answer questions in two Minecraft scenarios. Our preliminary findings suggest
that episodic memory capabilities in computational agents plays an important role in
producing explanations regarding an agent’s cognitive and behavioral abilities. With
continued research, we believe our approach can facilitate the harmonious integration
of robots with their human counterparts, creating an environment where humans and
artificial agents better understand each other.
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This research proposes to use a computational model of episodic memory as a core technology for
artificial agents that can explain their own behavior. Episodic memory is the memory responsible
for enabling one to remember the events of his or her life with a subjective sense of time, a sense
of self, and autonoetic1 consciousness (Tulving, 1985). In this thesis, we hypothesize that the ca-
pacity to remember the personal past using episodic memory plays an essential role in explainable
autonomy, which enables artificial systems to communicate their motivations and reasonings to
their end-users (Gunning, 2017). We present a theory that explains how episodic memory and its
related processes allow an agent to summarize its experience, answer questions about its past, and
engage in hypothetical thinking.
Many mainstream artificial intelligence systems today operate as black boxes that have little to
no ability to explain their rationale to users. This limits the effectiveness of intelligent agents in the
world, because their human users cannot predict or trust their behavior. An explainable agent will
help remedy this issue by providing justifications for its behavior and allowing users to understand
and predict its decision-making processes. We argue that such explainability is necessary because
the agent’s rationale needs to be well understood by users who wish to manage or collaborate with
it. To demonstrate this capacity, an agent must be able to:
• Summarize its personal history at appropriate levels of abstraction;
• Explain why and when it chose the goals it pursued;
• Explain how the goals were achieved;
1Autonoesis allows humans to mentally place themselves forwards or backwards in time.
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• Discuss how actions were executed in the world;
• Provide details on alternative options for achieving goals; and
• Expose any failures or difficulties it faced during planning or execution.
These requirements allow a user to understand and predict an agent’s internal decision-making
process, increasing the user’s confidence and trust in the agent’s behavior. Moreover, because
humans understand and use social cues and adhere to societal norms, computational agents should
model this capability, when interacting with humans. It should be natural for a human to interact
with such agents, meaning that humans should not have to learn new methods for communicating
with these agents. Our system uses a text-based mode of communication, but yet, adopts human-
like representations and knowledge, adheres to some social norms, and reasons about the beliefs
and goals of the users it is helping. To that end, we believe a cognitive systems approach is ideal to
achieve a high level of explainable autonomy because these systems commit to human-like notions
of beliefs, desires, and intentions. Additionally, it is desirable for explainable agents to receive and
apply feedback from users about their decision-making process.
This thesis includes our previous work where we developed episodic memory for a cognitive
architecture (Ménager & Choi, 2016), and characterizes the role of this memory in facilitating
explainable autonomy. Despite the fundamental importance of this memory, computational models
of episodic memory are not discussed very frequently, aside from some recent work (Nuxoll &
Laird, 2007; Faltersack et al., 2011; Bölöni, 2011). In this research, we borrow insights from
psychology and cognitive science literature to produce an integrated episodic memory module
within a cognitive architecture, ICARUS (Langley & Choi, 2006). Using this new cognitive faculty,
we built an agent that demonstrate explainable behavior.
In the remainder of this thesis, we first introduce the computer game we use as our domain.
Next, we review the ICARUS architecture briefly. Then, describe our episodic memory extension
within this system, addressing how to represent, organize, and retrieve experiences in this new
memory. Then, we discuss our episodic memory extension, covering the memory representations
and processes. Next, we present an ICARUS agent with explainable autonomy capabilities enabled
2
by episodic memory, followed by demonstrations of this agent’s ability to summarize its personal
past, answer questions, and engage in hypothetical thinking within a computer game. Next, we




Cognitive architectures are unified models of intelligent behavior. As such, they integrate many
different functional components of the mind to produce artifacts of cognition. Because cognitive
architectures feature a suite of tightly integrated memories and mental processes, it is not straight-
forward to evaluate them. Therefore, using a rich and dynamic domain like the game Minecraft
(Johnson et al., 2016) can support a systems-level understanding of these intelligent agents. More-
over, our aim is to produce a psychologically plausible system that interacts with humans in physi-
cal environments, so we need to go beyond simple domains and utilize a domain that affords many
of the cognitive functions that ICARUS provides. In particular, we desire a domain that permits an
agent to pursue high-level goals as well as exert low-level control in a physical environment.
2.1 The Minecraft Domain
Minecraft is a popular computer game that provides such an environment. In this open-world game,
players can create and experience new environments in which they can collect resources, build
structures, discover new lands, and more. Figure 2.1 shows an example scene from Minecraft
where the world is composed of blocks. Blocks can be of different kinds, such as stone, grass,
dirt, and bedrock, each having different physical properties. These objects can be organized to
construct the physical environment. For example, blocks can be arranged to form roads, buildings,
trees, rivers, and mountains. Entities are special kinds of blocks that represent moving objects with
numeric attributes such as position, rotation, and velocity. Entities can also have a health attribute
to represent the quality of their physical integrity. Example entities include players, mobs, boats,
4
Figure 2.1: Example scene from the Minecraft domain.
and items. Some of the entities like zombies, creepers, and spiders are hostile and can attack
players. When such entities die, they drop items which players and other agents can collect. Items
can also appear as a result of actions like mining.
Minecraft is ideal for our purposes because of the richness of the domain. The agents live in
an interactive and dynamic environment where events happen outside of the agent’s control. They
can cooperate with human and non-human players to solve complex problems. Furthermore, the
dynamic nature of the game forces the agents to construct robust plans and rely on their ability
to adapt to changes in the environment. The Minecraft world is also a continuous space, and the
agents need to be able to reason about continuous events.
2.2 Connecting ICARUS to the Minecraft Domain
Minecraft scenarios are initialized by a mission XML file. Using this file, the game engine estab-
lishes a server port that accepts connections from ICARUS agents. During initialization, the system
sets the initial properties of the world like the topography of the terrain, the location of items, and
the agent’s starting position and possessions. The system is also responsible for determining which
5
Table 2.1: Sample perceptual patterns in the Minecraft Domain.
(hotbar inventory-slot1 type air location 0 size 0 belongs-to self1)
(hotbar inventory-slot2 type stick-item1 location 0 size 4 belongs-to self1)
(self self1 action nil x 12.48 y -21.16 life 20 orientation 0.0)
(cooked_porkchop food1 x 2.27 y 0.56 z .53 orientation 242.93)
(planks planks1 x 12.48 y -21.11 z ?z 0.0 orientation 0.0)
(rotten_flesh rotten_flesh1 x 21.37 y .21 z .35 orientation 73.55)
(xporb xporb1 x 22.15 y 15.02 z 1.13 orientation 30.21)
(zombie zombie1 x 11.90 y -18.49 z 0.00 orientation 184.76 life 20)
(slime slime1 x 12.95 y 43.32 z 0.0 orientation 20.45 life 10)
perceptions and commands are available to the agent.
During run-time, ICARUS controls a single player, for which it receives sensory input from the
environment. The agent is able to perceive nearby entities within a 10 × 10 grid centered around
it, as well as the first eight items in its possession, stored in what Minecraft calls the hotbar.
Table 2.1 shows some sample objects and their attributes perceived by the agent. ICARUS receives
information about itself like, its current action, position, and orientation. It also perceives items in
its hotbar, including the slots of the hotbar, the types of objects in the slots, the quantity of elements
in each slot, and the owner of the hotbar items.
Additionally, ICARUS can control the player by submitting commands through the server con-
nection. The commands are interpreted by the Minecraft game engine to change the state of the
world. ICARUS can submit commands for movement, chatting, crafting, and inventory manage-
ment. The movement commands are unary functions named move, turn, and strafe. These func-
tions accept a decimal value between −1 and 1 to specify the degree to which that command is
to be executed. For example, move(−1) makes the player move backward at full speed, move(0)
stops the player, and move(1) makes the player move forward. The turn and strafe commands
work in a similar fashion. The chat command allows the agent to output messages onto the screen
to communicate with other players. It is a unary function that accepts a string message as its
argument. The simple craft command allows ICARUS to create new items from existing ones in
its inventory. This command accepts one argument, which is the item to be crafted. If the agent
possesses all the necessary items in the inventory before issuing this command, then the new item
will be created instantaneously. Finally, the inventory commands allow the agent to manipulate the
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items in its inventory slots. This is useful for switching the object in the agents hand, whether it is
a sword or another object.
In summary, Minecraft is a rich and dynamic domain to test our system for explainable au-
tonomy. It allows researchers to construct a wide array of interesting scenarios, and enables the
evaluation of explainable agents. For this reason, we use this domain to demonstrate how our sys-
tem enables building explainable agents, as will be shown in the later chapters. Before we do that,




As a cognitive architecture, ICARUS (Choi & Langley, 2018) provides an infrastructure for model-
ing human cognition and programming intelligent agents. The architecture makes specific commit-
ments to its representation of knowledge, the memories that store these contents, and the processes
that operate over them. ICARUS shares some of these commitments with other architectures like
Soar (Laird, 2012a) and ACT-R (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998), but it also has distinct characteristics
that differentiate it from those architectures, including its architectural emphases on hierarchical
knowledge structures, teleoreactive execution, and goal reasoning.
In this chapter, we review the ICARUS architecture that we use as a basis for our work on
episodic memory and explainable autonomy. We begin by discussing the representation and mem-
ories in ICARUS. Then, we continue to the processes that operate on these memories as part of a
cognitive cycle in the architecture.
3.1 Representation and Memories
ICARUS distinguishes two main types of knowledge, concepts and skills, which represent seman-
tic and procedural knowledge, respectively. Concepts describe certain aspects of a situation in
the environment. They resemble horn clauses (Horn, 1951), complete with a predicate as the
head, perceptual matching conditions, tests against matched variables, and references to any sub-
relations. A primitive concept is defined directly over a set of objects and their attributes, while
a non-primitive concept describes more complex situations, specifying how other concepts and
perceived objects relate to each other.
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Table 3.1 shows some sample ICARUS concepts for Minecraft. The first one, carrying, is a
primitive concept that describes when the agent is carrying something in its inventory. It requires
perceptual elements for the agent itself, ?self and the inventory, hotbar. The second concept, front-
of, is a non-primitive concept that describes the situation where an entity is in front of the agent.
It requires a perceptual match against the agent itself, a sub-relation (entity ?o1), and a test over
the positions of the two. The last concept definition, on-horizontal-axis, is another non-primitive
concept that uses both of the earlier definitions as sub-relations to define the situation where the
entity is not being held by the agent and is on the same horizontal line as the agent.
Table 3.1: Sample ICARUS concepts for the Minecraft domain.
((carrying ?o1 ?o2 ∧type ?type ∧location ?loc ∧size ?size)
:elements ((self ?o1)
(hotbar ?o2 ∧type ?type ∧location ?loc
∧size ?size ∧belongs-to ?o1))
:tests ((> ?size 0)))
((front-of ?o1 ?self)
:elements ((self ?self ∧y ?y))
:conditions ((entity ?o1 ∧y ?y1))




(not (front-of ?o1 ?self))
(not (behind-of ?o1 ?self))
(not (carrying ?o1 ?self))))
ICARUS’ skills describe procedures to achieve certain concept instances in the environment.
They are hierarchical versions of STRIPS operators (Fikes & Nilsson, 1971) with a named head,
perceptual matching conditions, preconditions that need to be true to execute, direct actions to
perform in the world or any sub-skills, and the intended effects of the execution. A primitive skill
describes the effect of specified actions given a set of satisfied conditions. A non-primitive skill
describes a more complex procedure by specifying the ordered execution of its simpler sub-skills.
Table 3.2 shows some sample ICARUS skills for Minecraft. The first one, move-forward-to, is
a primitive skill that describes a procedure to move the agent toward an entity, which is executable
only when something is in front of the agent. This skill uses a direct action, *move-forward,
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that continuously move the agent forward at a specified speed. The next skill, walk-to, is a non-
primitive skill that describes what steps the agent needs to take to be near an entity. Notice that
executing the skill involves an ordered execution of multiple primitive skills including the first
example. The last skill, gather-resource, is another non-primitive skill that describes how the
system can gather a resource. In order to execute this skill, a resource should be present in the
world and all that needs to be done is for the agent to walk to the resource using the second skill
shown in the table. Upon completion, the agent will be carrying the resource as an effect.
Table 3.2: Sample ICARUS skills for the Minecraft domain.
((move-forward-to ?o1)
:elements ((self ?self))
:conditions ((front-of ?o1 ?self))
:actions ((*move-forward))














:effects ((carrying ?self ?o1)))
ICARUS distinguishes between long-term and short-term memories. Long-term memories store
stable contents, whereas short-term memory contents change frequently over time. The long-term
memory in ICARUS consists of conceptual long-term memory and skill long-term memory which
store concepts and skills respectively. The ICARUS short-term memory is compartmentalized into
a belief memory, and an intention memory. ICARUS stores concept instances, or beliefs, in its
belief memory. These take the form of a concept definition with associated arguments that ground
the concept to the current state. Similarly, ICARUS stores skill instances, or intentions, inside its




















Figure 3.1: ICARUS cycle diagram with the episodic memory module colored in red.
3.2 Execution and Problem Solving
During run time, ICARUS operates in cycles as shown in Figure 3.1. At the beginning of each cycle,
the architecture receives perceptual information from the world as a list of uniquely identified
objects with their attribute-value pairs. After depositing them into its perceptual buffer, the system
computes a belief state by invoking the conceptual inference process, during which the system
finds the instances of its concepts that are true based on the current perceptual information. The
process occurs in a bottom-up fashion to ensure that all possible inferences are made. ICARUS
stores the inferred beliefs in its belief memory, like shown in Table 3.3.
Once the system uncovers the state of the world by inferring all possible beliefs, it proceeds
to its goal reasoning step, where the agent can nominate, retract, and prioritize its top-level goals
according to their relevance conditions. Only the goals that are relevant tot he current situation
will be nominated and prioritized, and any other existing goals will be retracted. After ICARUS
selects a set of goals, it attempts to find a skill that achieves one or more of its top-level goals. This
process is teleoreactive, in that ICARUS commits to the goals it has but, at the same time, stays
reactive to the environment. When the architecture finds a skill that will achieve one or more of
its goals, ICARUS instantiates this skill as its intention and stores it in its intention memory. The
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system will then execute the intention either by invoking its direct actions if it is a primitive, or by
following one of the sub-skills and executing it recursively.
Table 3.3: Sample ICARUS beliefs from the Minecraft domain.
(ACTOR SELF1 ACTION ((*TURN-RIGHT)))
(ALIVE ZOMBIE1)
(ENEMY ZOMBIE1 ∧X -0.91 ∧Y 1.92 ∧Z -0.94 ∧ORIENTATION -160.2 ∧LIFE 10.78)





If, however, the architecture is unable to find a skill instance that satisfies a goal, it invokes the
problem solver to find a solution to the problem. The default method for finding such a solution is
a version of backward-chaining means-ends analysis, which decomposes the top-level goals into
subgoals or chain skills to achieve unsatisfied preconditions. When the system finds a solution
through this process, it can learn new skills upon a successful execution of the solution steps. Al-
though these processes are important aspects of the ICARUS architecture, the current work focuses
on its episodic memory and how we can use it for explainable autonomy. For this reason, we refer
the interested reader to previous work (Langley & Choi, 2006; Choi & Langley, 2018) for more
detailed discussions on these processes.
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Chapter 4
Episodic Memory in ICARUS
Episodic memory plays an essential role in storing, organizing, and remembering the events of
one’s life. Using this memory, one can be mentally transported back in time to re-experience
the past. In this chapter, we explore how this capacity can be modeled in ICARUS, helping us to
understand the nature of episodic memory and its functional role in cognition. The psychologically
inspired theory we present here assumes that:
• Episodic memory is a long-term memory that stores episodes;
• Episodes encode a set of co-occurring events as first-order propositions;
• Episodes contain descriptions of both the agent’s internal state and external environments;
• Episodes are organized in a hierarchy, such that each sub-hierarchy contains a collection of
structurally similar episodes;
• Episodes at the higher levels of the hierarchy variablize individual differences of the episodes
at the lower levels; and
• Remembering an event involves using a retrieval cue to match against the propositional pat-
terns stored in the episodes.
We believe episodic memory is an archive that stores an agent’s personal experiences (Martin
& Deutscher, 1966). The representation in this memory for such experiences are called episodes,
which preserve the contents of the agent’s experiences. As Tulving (1983) suggests, episodic
memory is a long-term memory that stores records of the agent’s experiences. Furthermore, we
hold that the contents of an episode are causally linked to the event that the episode captures.
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In our theory, episodes are mental images of personal events. We believe that events cannot be
captured in a single instant, but rather, they happen over time, starting at one instant and ending
at a later time. Episodes in our theory are an ordered pair of propositional states that, when take
together, describe an event. For example, an episode can represent an event where “David kicked
the ball into the net” with two states. The first describes David’s foot position near the ball and
its orientation toward the ball, whereas the next state describes the ball in the net. States can also
include an agent’s action as an attribute of that agent.
In addition to descriptions of the external environment, our theory claims that episodes can also
contain descriptions of the agent’s internal state, such as the agent’s goals and intentions. In this
way, ICARUS agents can remember not only what happened in the world, but also remember their
own decision making and actions in those contexts.
Furthermore, we believe that episodes are grouped in a hierarchy. Those episodes describing
similar events are grouped under the same sub-hierarchy, while episodes that are distinct belong to
different sub-hierarchies. In our view, an episode is similar to another episode if its state sequences
are relationally equivalent under first-order unification. Additionally, the hierarchy is ordered in
such a way that each child episode is a more specific version of its parent.
To explain this further, Schiller et al. (2015) argue that episodic memory receives many of its
characteristics from the hippocampus. One function of this brain region is to create a hierarchical
network of experience. As the cognitive system places episodes in memory, the hippocampus is
believed to dynamically change the structure of this network in order to preserve the similarity
relationship between related experiences. In our theory, we model this such that each episode
in the hierarchy variablizes the individual differences amongst its children, so as to preserve the
structural equivalence relation.
Finally, psychological evidence suggests that episodic memory is an index-based memory
(Hellerstedt, 2015; Tulving, 1983), in which episodes are organized in a way that they can be
retrieved using semantic patterns or retrieval cues. A proper episodic system must be able to match























Figure 4.1: Block diagram depicting ICARUS’ episodic memory components and information flow
starting from the belief memory.
find the most similar episode in the memory. In cases where multiple episodes are equally similar
to the cue, the memory system should employ some conflict resolution strategies.
These theoretical postulates in our theory have all been incorporated into our implementation of
episodic memory in ICARUS. In the rest of this chapter, we describe the details of the implemented
system starting with the organization of the memory components and continuing to the processes
that work over them.
4.1 Episodic Representation and Structures
According to Tulving (1983), an episode is a mental construct composed of a sequence of observed
changes, with subjectively defined start and end points. Our representation of episodes includes
start and end states, as well as the system’s choice for the index. There also is a field for specifying
how many times the episode occurred and the temporal ordering of these episodes in memory.
More formally, an episode is a tuple that includes a head which contains pointers that tempo-
rally locate the episode in the state-intention cache; the start state of the episode; the end state
of the episode; the set of significant beliefs in the end state; and a count for the number of times
the episode has occurred. Table 4.1 shows a notional episode from Minecraft. In this example,
15
Table 4.1: Notional episode from Minecraft.
episode(ptr1,ptr2,...,ptrn)
start: ((resource planks1))
end: ((carrying me planks_item1))
significant-beliefs: ((carrying me planks_item1))
count: n
the agent initially observes a resource called planks1. Then at a later time, the observes that it is
carrying a plank item.
The architecture organizes its episodic memory as a compound structure composed of an
episodic beliefs-intention cache, a concept frequency forest, and the episodic generalization tree.
Research suggests that there exists an episodic buffer that interfaces between the episodic memory
and the working memory. This buffer is responsible for incorporating diverse sets of sensory input
and creating a unified representation (Baddeley, 2000). The information deposited into the buffer
are later integrated into long-term storage as an episode in the episodic memory. To model this, the
extended ICARUS has a state-intention cache, (ρ) which stores the state-intention sequence in the
order they occurred. This structure is believed to have a limited capacity but, in our current work,
we assume that ICARUS can store the complete record of its experience in this cache.
ICARUS also has a concept frequency forest (F) that enables the agent to maintain the statistics
of what happens in the world. The system uses it to detect significant events that occur. There
can be many different ways to do this, but our current implementation includes trees in this forest
structure that use the agent’s location as the root nodes. Each tree maintains the relative frequency
of the beliefs, conditioned on the agent’s location.
Finally, ICARUS’ episodic memory includes an episodic generalization tree (T). This structure
organizes the agent’s episodes into a hierarchy. The leaf nodes of this tree are fully instantiated
episodes that the agent has experienced, and the non-leaf level nodes in the tree stores partially
generalized episodes. An episode is partially generalized when it unifies under first-order predicate
unification with another episode, i.e, the two episodes are structurally similar.
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4.2 Episodic Processes
Figure 4.1 depicts how the components of the episodic memory work together. When ICARUS’
inferred beliefs are posited into the state-intention cache, the system checks them for significant
beliefs that violate its expectations formed by the frequency forest. Once the architecture identifies
such beliefs, it creates an episode to capture the event and stores it in its episodic generalization
tree. Then, the system attempts to form generalizations based on all the episodes in the tree,
including the one just inserted.
To bring clarity to these episodic memory processes, we discuss each of them in detail below.
We begin with how the system caches the state-intention sequence and constructs the concept
frequency forest. Then, we explain how episodes are formed and inserted into memory, after
which we describe how the episodes can be generalized to induce the episodic hierarchy. Finally,
we discuss how episodes are retrieved when ICARUS needs them.
4.2.1 Storing State-Intention Sequence
As stated earlier, ICARUS operates in cycles. On each cycle, the system infers a new belief state.
This state can represent beliefs about objects as well as other agents. Overt actions carried out by
other agents are represented in the beliefs for those agents. After the system infers a belief state,
it is put into the state-intention cache. The system also records the ICARUS agent’s intention for
each state. So, when the system acts, it perceives the overt actions of other agents, as well as has
an understanding of it’s own intentions. In our implementation, once the state is collected into the
cache, the system processes it to find significant beliefs. These are beliefs that the agent rarely finds
true. In order to determine rarity, ICARUS tracks the relative frequency of all beliefs conditioned
on location and uses this information to form its expectations. The system applies two expectation
thresholds to the frequency information stored in the concept frequency forest.
The agent expects to see any belief with a conditional probability, given the location, greater
than the positive threshold, and it expects to not see any belief with a probability less than the
17
negative threshold. A belief that violates either of these expectations is a significant belief, which
prompts the system to create an episode. This is consistent with Kurby and Zacks (2008) where the
authors argue that humans perceive the beginning of a new episode when his or her expectations
are violated.
4.2.2 Inserting Episodes
ICARUS continuously monitors incoming belief states for significant, unexpected beliefs using its
concept frequency forest. When the system finds itself in an unexpected state, it interprets this as
a clue that a new event is taking place. Then, the system creates an episode at the event boundary
between the previous and new states. Table 4.2 shows this process in pseudocode. The first five
lines declare the necessary variables needed to perform insertion. Among these are the state-
intention cache, the agent’s current location, the current and the previous states, and the agent’s
intention. Next, the system adds the current state and intention to the cache (Line 6) and checks for
significant beliefs in the state on Line 7. When the system detects one or more significant beliefs, it
creates an episode using the previous and the current states and inserts it into the episodic memory.
Table 4.2: Pseudocode for creating a new episode.
1: ρ ← state-intention cache
2: loc← current location
3: Bc← current belief state
4: ι ← agent’s intention
5: Bprev← last state in ρ
6: ρ ← ρ.add(Bc, ι)
7: sigs← GETINTERESTINGBELIEFS(Bc, loc)
8: if not NULL(sigs) then
9: ε ← MAKEEPISODE(sigs, Bc, Bprev)
10: T← INSERT(ε , T)
To insert the new episode at the proper location the episodic memory, the system searches
through the episodic generalization tree in a level-order fashion as shown in Table 4.3. Starting
at the root of the tree, and ICARUS checks each node, level by level to find a matching episode
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whose significant beliefs unify under first-order predicate unification with those of the new episode.
During this search, if the system finds an exact match that requires no substitutions, the counter for
the existing episode is incremented by one, and the new episode is not inserted again (Lines 7 - 9).
In case of a generalized match, where unification is only possible with substitutions, the system
increases the count for the matching episode, and continues searching for further matches among
the episodes that are children of the previous match (Lines 10 - 14). If at any level, the system
does not find any matches between the existing episodes in the hierarchy and the new episode, the
system places the latter as a child of the current parent episode (Lines 17 - 19).
Table 4.3: Pseudocode for inserting a new episode.
1: queue← /0
2: temp← root of T
3: match← /0
4: p← /0
5: while not NULL(temp) do
6: match← STRUCTURALEQ?(temp, ε)
7: if match is exact match then
8: temp.count← temp.count +1
9: BREAK
10: else if match is bc of unification then
11: temp.count← temp.count +1
12: queue← /0




17: if null(temp) and match not exact then
18: p← p.ADDCHILD(ε)
19: T← GENERALIZE(p, ε)
4.2.3 Generalizing Episodes
ICARUS supports episodic generalization during insertion into its episodic tree during insertion.
Through this process, the architecture maintains a taxonomic hierarchy of episodes induced by the
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structural similarity of episodes. The system is able to detect new similarity relationships among
sibling episodes at each level, potentially enhancing the taxonomic hierarchy of episodes at each
insertion.
Table 4.4 shows a pseudocode for this process. Two sibling episodes εi and ε j of the current
parent εp, generalize if and only if there exists episode εg, such that εg is the parent of both εi and
εg, but neither of them can be the parent of εg. If this is the case, the variablize function on
Line 5 returns the sets of variable bindings from εg to εi and from εg to ε j. This means that εg is
a first-order predicate unifier for εi and ε j, which is tested again for validity on Line 6. If such a
generalized episode εg that is more specific than the original parent εp, then εg becomes a child
of εp, and εi and ε j become the children of εg. The count for the generalized episode will be the
summation of the counts for its children.
4.2.4 Retrieving Episodes
The episodic memory in ICARUS supports cue-based retrieval to allow the agent to recall its per-
sonal past. Retrieval cues are propositional patterns, in the form of partially instantiated concept
heads that can include some unassigned variables, the values of which are not relevant to the mean-
ing of the cue.
The retrieval process is recursively carried out in a level-order fashion through the episodic
generalization tree.. At each node in the tree, the system performs relational matching against the
elements in the episode and the retrieval cue. The matching process can return an exact match,
a generalized match, or no match at all. An exact match means that the cue is contained in the
episode, exactly as specified. A generalized match means that there exists an episode that matches
the cue in an instantiated form. If the system finds a generalized match, it adds the match to a list
of matches and continues the search on that level. For each match found at that level, the system
recurses on its children.
In summary, ICARUS records the belief state and executed intentions into the episodic cache
and updates the frequency forest every cycle. When the agent identifies one or more significant
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Table 4.4: Pseudocode for generalizing episodes.
1: if NOT(NULL(εp)) then
2: children← GETSUBEPISODES(εp)
3: εg← /0
4: for ε j ∈ children do
5: εg← VARIABLIZE(ε j, εi)





beliefs in the belief state, it constructs a new episode and inserts it into the generalization tree.
After insertion, the system checks to see if the new episode can generalize with any of its siblings.
As a result, the root node of the generalization tree is the most general episode, having an arbitrary
number of children, and the episodes become more specific at increasingly lower level levels. The
leaf nodes of the tree are fully instantiated episodes.
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Chapter 5
ICARUS Agent with Explainable Autonomy
We argue that episodic memory lends itself to answering questions about the personal past, en-
abling explainable autonomy in artificial agents. In this chapter, we describe the episodic phenom-
ena that we believe are essential to explainability and present an ICARUS agent that takes advantage
of the new episodic extension to exhibit question answering capabilities. We also present a demon-
stration of such capacities in Minecraft.
5.1 Episodic Memory for Explainable Autonomy
Episodic memory enables several unique psychological phenomena that are suitable for explain-
able autonomy. Evidence shows that humans with episodic memory can summarize personal past
experiences at appropriate levels of detail, answer questions about their intentions, goals, and be-
liefs, and use personal history to predict their future behavior in hypothetical situations (Atance,
2015; Kurby & Zacks, 2008). Individuals with deficiencies in their episodic memory generally
cannot demonstrate such behaviors. Given this, a computational model of episodic memory, with
its associated mental structures and processes, should also allow an artificial agent to remember its
personal past and use those memories to expose its internal decision-making processes to its user.
The behaviors we think are most suited for explainable autonomy include summarization, ques-
tion answering, and hypothetical thinking. We explain each of these episodic phenomena below
and also provide insight on how to achieve explainable agents using episodic memory.
Summarization: People can summarize their past experiences. They are able to provide informa-
tion at appropriate levels of abstraction, rather than spewing low-level information about quotidian
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happenings that may overwhelm their counterparts. People can also provide more detailed sum-
maries whenever someone asks.
Question answering: People are able to answer a variety of questions about their internal decision-
making processes and overt behaviors. Among other things, people can explain how and why goals
were achieved, how and why actions and behaviors were executed, and which alternative methods
they have considered. Question answering is not a one-off behavior. People can provide more
detailed information when asked, and they can also answer follow-up questions about their goals,
beliefs, and intentions at varying levels of detail.
Hypothetical thinking: People can think about and discuss with others what they might do in the
future. Psychological evidence from Atance (2015) shows that young children’s ability to think
about their future depends on what they remember about their past. One well studied individual
with episodic memory impairments, patient K.C., also showed that he could not imagine himself
in the future (Tulving, 2002).
Our goal is to create agents that demonstrate this range of behaviors using episodic memory
and facilitate explainability with the episodic contents. An agent records its personal experiences
as episodes, which are stored and organized inside its episodic memory. Processing episodic mem-
ory contents allows an agent to expose details about its past experience. This emphasizes the
role of knowledge and information processing in explainable autonomy. In contrast to popular
machine learning techniques, the cognitive systems approach recognizes that explainable agency
is not purely a matter of inputs and outputs, but multi-step mental processes that involve many
different modules in the cognitive architecture that are domain independent.
5.2 ICARUS Agent with Episodic Capabilities
Using the extended ICARUS, we programmed an agent that plays Minecraft scenarios and answers
questions about its experience achieving goals. We gave it the task of defending itself against zom-
bies, which requires positioning and maneuvering the agent to face the zombie while maintaining
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Table 5.1: Taxonomy and partonomy in ICARUS concepts for Minecraft.
((resource ?o1 ∧x ?x ∧y ?y ∧z ?z ∧orientation ?orientation)
:elements ((planks ?o1 ∧x ?x ∧y ?y ∧z ?z ∧orientation ?orientation)))
((enemy ?o1 ∧x ?x ∧y ?y ∧z ?z ∧orientation ?orientation ∧life ?life)
:elements ((zombie ?o1 ∧x ?x ∧y ?y ∧z ?z ∧orientation ?orientation ∧life ?life)))
((entity ?o1 ∧x ?x ∧y ?y ∧z ?z ∧orientation ?orientation)
:conditions ((enemy ?o1 ∧x ?x ∧y ?y ∧z ?z ∧orientation ?orientation)))
((entity ?o1 ∧x ?x ∧y ?y ∧z ?z ∧orientation ?orientation)
:conditions ((resource ?o1 ∧x ?x ∧y ?y ∧z ?z ∧orientation ?orientation)))
((carrying-sword-materials)
:conditions ((carrying ?self ?planks ∧type ?type1 ∧size ?size1)
(carrying ?self ?sticks ∧type ?type2 ∧size ?size2))




an appropriate distance to strike the it, and sometimes also involves gathering materials and as-
sembling a weapon. The rich interactions in the game makes the task of defending itself against
a zombie cognitively complex. At any given moment, multiple options exist for choosing a good
defensive position and attacking the zombies. For this reason, explaining the agent’s behavior is
not a trivial task.
In order to generate reasonable behavior, the agent requires some domain knowledge with
which to reason about the world of Minecraft. We gave the agent 53 concepts, including 15 prim-
itive concepts and 37 skills, including 23 primitive skills. In addition to the concepts shown in
Table 3.1 earlier, Table 5.1 shows some sample concept definitions that include information on
how objects relate to each other taxonomically and partonomically. For example, the first four def-
initions say that resources and enemies are all examples of entities, and the last concept states that
carrying planks and sticks are all part of carrying materials for making a sword. The sample skills
shown previously in Table 3.2 allow ICARUS to accomplish different tasks in Minecraft. These
skills described some of the overt behaviors the agent can demonstrate.
In addition to the suite of skills for accomplishing tasks, ICARUS also has some skill for ques-
tion answering. For instance, consider the skill for answering questions about how a goal was
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accomplished shown in Table 5.2. This skill allows the agent to answer questions about how it
achieved a goal. Notice that ICARUS receives the user’s question as a perception, where ?o1 is the
subject of the question. This can either be the name of a belief, or the name of a skill. The type
denotes whether the question pertains to a goal or an intention. The questions also include how or
why the agent behaves the way it did, as well as alternative ways of achieving a goal or executing
an intention. These are specified as Boolean attributes to the question percept. If the agent believes
that the user is not informed about the subject of the question, then the system attempts to answer
the question to change that.
Table 5.2: An ICARUS skill for question answering.
((inform-how ?o1)
:elements ((question ?o1 type goal how t))
:conditions ((uninformed ?o1))
:actions ((*explain-goal-achievement ?o1))
:effects ((not (uninformed ?o1))))
The work for carrying out the explanation is encapsulated in the action *explain-goal-achievement,
outlined in Table 5.3. It starts with the agent retrieving a history of previously executed intentions
from its episodic memory (Line 1). These goals that these intentions achieved are then examined
for relevance to the question (Line 2). Once a match is found, the system synthesizes text that gets
output to the screen (Line 3).
Table 5.3: Pseudocode for explaining goal achievements.
1: for intention in REMEMBER(ρ,τ,goal) do
2: if goal ∈ intention.effects then
3: SAY("I did ?x to achieve ?y", intention.head, goal)
Table 5.4 provides more details on how ICARUS remembers all relevant experiences. The
system first returns a list of episodes that are relevant to the goal. Then, for each returned episode,
the system recovers the intention information by following the cache pointers of the episode. The
system returns all such intentions that are not empty.
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Table 5.4: Pseudocode for remembering the agent’s past through episodic retrievals.
1: remembered← RETRIEVE(τ , goal)
2: idxs← /0
3: ints← /0
4: for all episode in remembered do
5: collect episode.cache-pointers into idxs
6: for all idx in idxs do
7: executed-intention← ρ .intentions[idx]
8: if not NULL(executed-intention) then
9: collect executed-intention into ints
10: return ints
5.3 Demonstrations
To evaluate the new question answering capacity based on the episodic memory, we designed
two scenarios. The first scenario placed an ICARUS agent in a room with a zombie and told
the agent to defend itself like shown in Figure 5.1. After the agent successfully neutralized the
threat, we asked the agent a series of questions about what happened. In the second scenario, the
agent is tasked to make a sword. The agent must collect the necessary resources to to craft the
word, build its components, then assemble the sword. After completing this task, we asked the
agent about several questions to explain how it built the sword. We present is a transcript of the
interactions after these two scenarios, where we write English translations of the questions in bold,
the perceptual representation of the question underneath, and the agent’s response in bullet points.
5.3.1 Scenario One: Simple Zombie
Goal Achievement: How did you achieve the goal where the zombie1 is not present?
(question not_enemy_zombie1 type goal how t)
• I did (ATTACK ZOMBIE1) to achieve (NOT (ENEMY ZOMBIE1)).
• I did (KILL ZOMBIE1) to achieve (NOT (ENEMY ZOMBIE1)).
In this response, the system exposes that it performed two different procedures for clearing the
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Figure 5.1: ICARUS fighting a zombie in Minecraft.
room of the zombie. We discover why these two different procedures were followed in the next
two questions.
Skill Selection: Why did you choose to attack zombie1?
(question attack_zombie1 type intention why t)
• I executed (ATTACK ZOMBIE1) because I wanted to achieve
((NOT (ENEMY ZOMBIE1))).
All I had to do make it executable was to have:
((ARMED-AND-DANGEROUS ME) (NEXT-TO ZOMBIE1 ME))
Skill Selection: Why did you choose to kill zombie1?
(question kill_zombie1 type intention why t)
• I executed (KILL ZOMBIE1) because I wanted to achieve:
((NOT (ENEMY ZOMBIE1))).
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All I had to do make it executable was to have:
((ARMED-AND-DANGEROUS ME))
I could have done (ATTACK ZOMBIE1), but at the time
((NEXT-TO ZOMBIE1 ME) (ARMED-AND-DANGEROUS ME))
were unsatisfied conditions.
Notice that the agent makes known alternatives that it could have chosen and explains why they
were not selected. This example shows that when presented with two or more skills to achieve the
same goal, ICARUS will select the skill with the the fewest number of unsatisfied preconditions.
This heuristic shortens the amount of time the agent spends problem solving, resulting in faster
reaction times. Next, we find out about the structure of (KILL ?O1) and (ATTACK ?O1).
Skill Execution: What are the subskills or actions to execute attack zombie1?
(question attack_zombie1 type intention how t)
• I executed (ATTACK ZOMBIE1) by performing motor functions:
((*ATTACK ’ZOMBIE1))
The attack skill is an appropriate in the situation, and the agent tells the user that it executed the
motor functions to complete the task.
Skill Execution: What are the subskills or actions to kill zombie1?
(question kill_zombie1 type intention how t)
• I executed (KILL ZOMBIE1) by following steps:
((OFFENSIVE-GO-TO ZOMBIE1) (ATTACK ZOMBIE1))
The agent reveals that (KILL ?O1) is a more abstract description of how to remove a zombie than
(ATTACK ?O1), which is contained as the second subskill in the former. In this Minecraft scenario,
a zombie arbitrarily moves around until it sees the ICARUS agent at a distance. Then, it tries to
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get closer and attack the agent. In the ICARUS agent’s perspective, when the zombie is far from
it, the most appropriate skill to select is (KILL ?O1), which includes a plan for moving toward
the zombie followed by one for attacking it. When the zombie is next to the ICARUS agent, the
appropriate skill is simply to (ATTACK ?O1), because the zombie is already in proximity, and the
system can execute primitive attack actions to achieve its ends.
Subgoal Decomposition: Why did you nominate the goal of being armed and dangerous?
(question armed-and-dangerous_me type goal why t)
• I nominated (ARMED-AND-DANGEROUS ME) because it was a necessary condition for
(KILL ZOMBIE1).
In this response, the agent explains its reasons for trying to achieve situations in the world. In the
current implementation, goals are either given to the agent as a top-level goal, or the system can
select subgoals to achieve which it thinks will allow it to achieve its top-level goal.
5.3.2 Scenario Two: Sword Crafter
Goal Achievement: How did you achieve the goal where you are holding an wooden sword in
your hand?
(question holding_me_wooden-sword-item1 type goal how t)
• I did (EQUIP WOODEN_SWORD_ITEM1) to achieve (HOLDING ME WOODEN_SWORD_ITEM1).
The agent responds that it was holding the wooden sword because it decided to equip it. The
agent’s explanation reveals its understanding of the causal relationship between its behavior, and
the goals they can achieve.
Goal Achievement: How did you achieve the goal where you are carrying an wooden sword?
(question carrying-wooden-sword_me_wooden-sword-item1 type goal how t)
• I did (CRAFT-WOODEN-SWORD STICK_ITEM1 PLANKS_ITEM1) to achieve
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(CARRYING-WOODEN-SWORD ME WOODEN_SWORD_ITEM1).
Skill Execution: What are the subskills or actions to make an wooden sword?
(question craft-wooden-sword_stick-item1_planks-item1 type intention how t)
• I executed (CRAFT-WOODEN-SWORD STICK_ITEM1 PLANKS_ITEM1) by
performing motor functions: ((*MAKE wooden_sword))
In this response, the system reveals that making a wooden sword is a primitive skill. In
Minecraft, an agent can craft items using simple craft commands so long as it is carrying all of
the item’s constituent parts.
Skill Selection: Why did you choose to make an wooden sword?
(question craft-wooden-sword_stick-item1_planks_item1 type intention why t)
• I executed (CRAFT-WOODEN-SWORD STICK_ITEM1 PLANKS_ITEM1) because
I wanted to achieve: ((CARRYING-WOODEN-SWORD SELF1 ?2)).
All I had to to do make to it executable was to have:
((CARRYING-SWORD-MATERIALS SELF1 STICK_ITEM1 PLANKS_ITEM1))
Before the system crafts a wooden sword it needs to possess all of the sword materials, namely
a stick and a some planks. Even though crafting a wooden sword is a primitive skill, the agent still
needs to make and successfully execute a plan to satisfy its precondition.
Goal Achievement: How did you achieve the goal where you are carrying materials for a
sword?
(question carrying-sword-materials_me_stick-item1_planks-item1 type goal how t)
• I did (GATHER-SWORD-MATERIALS PLANKS2 ?PLANK2 ?PLANK3 ?PLANK4) to achieve
(CARRYING-SWORD-MATERIALS ME STICK-ITEM1 PLANKS-ITEM1).
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In this response, the system reveals that it plans on acquiring the sword materials by going to
collect four planks. At the moment when the agent was planning, it had only committed itself to
gather planks2. Later on, it would decide which other planks to pick up.
Skill Execution: What are the subskills or actions to gather materials for a sword?
(question gather-sword-materials_planks2_?planks2_?planks3_?planks4 type intention how t)





Here, the system reveals that gathering the sword materials requires gathering the stick materials,
and the sword blade materials, then crafting a stick. Again, ICARUS was not sure which planks to
gather and also does not know which stick it will make. For now, it suffices that ICARUS knows
that it will make a stick.
Skill Execution: What are the subskills or actions to gather materials for a stick?
(question gather-stick-materials_planks2_?plank2 type intention how t)
• I executed (GATHER-STICK-MATERIALS PLANKS2 PLANKS1) by following steps:
((GATHER-RESOURCE PLANKS2) (GATHER-RESOURCE PLANKS1))
The system chose to ground the plank variables to actual plank objects in the world when it
started executing (GATHER-STICK-MATERIALS ?O1 ?O2).
Skill Execution: What are the subskills or actions to gather a resource?
(question gather-resource_?plank type intention how t)
• I executed (GATHER-RESOURCE PLANKS1) by following steps: ((WALK-TO PLANKS1))
I executed (GATHER-RESOURCE PLANKS2) by following steps: ((WALK-TO PLANKS2))
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The agent reveals that it was able to gather PLANKS1 and PLANKS2 by walking to them.
Since Minecraft is a continuous domain, (WALK-TO ?O1) involves a combination of moving
forward, backwards, turning left, and turning right, but for brevity, we leave out these details from
the explanations.
The debriefing could go on further in a similar fashion. The ICARUS agent is able to describe
in detail information about its decision-making process that allows a user to predict its behavior
and make expectations about what tasks the system can accomplish. Note that a system without
episodic memory capabilities will not be able to answer questions about its behavior, not to mention
provide appropriate information in this level of detail. This demonstrates that researching the role





The novel contributions of the current work are inspired by many previous work in several different
directions. We begin by reviewing work on memory, and then discuss explainable autonomy.
6.1 Memory
Some previous work in cognitive systems discussed episodic memory in computational agents.
Most notably, Soar (Laird, 2012b) has an episodic memory that contains sequentially ordered
snapshots of the agent’s working memory (Nuxoll & Laird, 2007). The authors present a series of
design decisions that are generically supported by psychological evidence. The episodic memory
in ICARUS is also psychologically inspired, but the architecture has a commitment to hierarchical
organization of episodes in memory that Soar does not have. The episodic memory in Soar stores
episodes in a flat list and it searches the entire memory during retrieval using the specified cue,
where as our system can find an episode that is representative of its children in the hierarchy.
More recently, a previous version of ICARUS had episodic memory-like capabilities. Stracuzzi
et al. (2009) extended the architecture to reason over time by adding timestamps to concept in-
stances. In order to utilize the timestamps, the system posits new beliefs into the belief memory
without first clearing previous ones. With this extension, ICARUS was able to reason about the
temporal relationship that exists in the world. In comparison, the current extension gives ICARUS
a dedicated episodic memory that stores episodes, which allows the system to remember what hap-
pened. The previous work represents the passage of time only by changing numeric attributes of
beliefs, and this does not qualify as an episodic memory with which the system can create and
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store episodes. Consequently, that system has no explicit notion of experience. Our system also
has the ability to explain its behavior by recalling its past experiences which the previous work did
not cover.
In addition to these cognitive systems, work in incremental concept formation is also rele-
vant to episodic memory because such systems build a hierarchy of experiences from individual
instances. One of the most famous examples is COBWEB (Fisher, 1987). Like many of its pre-
decessors, COBWEB induces a concept hierarchy from input data in an online fashion. Training
instances are represented as lists of attribute value pairs with associated probabilities and are sorted
in a tree from top to bottom. Although COBWEB made improvements on its predecessors, it could
only represent states as lists of attribute value pairs, and attributes could only take discrete values.
Subsequent systems based on COBWEB tried to address some of its limitations. Gennari et al.
(1989) developed a system that handles numeric attributes by modeling the occurrence of an at-
tribute value as a normal random variable. Most recently, TRESTLE (MacLellan et al., 2015)
succeeds in performing incremental concept formation with both symbolic and numeric values.
ICARUS’ episodic memory differs from these systems in three important ways. First our sys-
tem does not represent probabilistic states. Instead, ICARUS stores probabilities in the concept
frequency forest, and its generalization hierarchy is induced by variablizing individual differences
amongst lower-level episodes. Second, episodes in ICARUS’ episodic memory have a temporal
dimension and are not snapshots of single states. The only system, to our knowledge, that can
represent episodes like this is TRESTLE. Structures called components can form an episode by
specifying its component states. In order for this to work, however, each state in a component must
be represented as a list of attribute-value pairs. So, TRESTLE cannot represent propositional states
using components only. Third, the episodic memory in ICARUS is part of the system’s cognitive
architecture. Because of this, its episodic memory can store and remember the agent’s plans. The
other memory systems cannot do this since they are not part of a larger cognitive system.
In addition to incremental models of memory, Hochreiter and Schmidhuber (1997) devised
a Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) in recurrent neural networks that can be remember state
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information for arbitrarily long time intervals. Mahasseni et al. (2017) show that this technique can
be used to summarize experiences. It takes a video as input and returns a sequence of frames that
represent the video. The ability to summarize video into a series of key frames bares resemblance
to the summarization capability in ICARUS’ episodic memory, however, there are many distinctions
between ICARUS’ episodic memory and this work. The first is that ICARUS’ episodic memory is
a tree structure built incrementally over time. The LSTM’s structure, on the other hand, is set
before training occurs. Another key difference is that ICARUS can summarize events at multiple
levels of details, while the LSTM can only summarizes video at one level of detail. Furthermore,
ICARUS explanations are human-readable, while the LSTM only presents key frames for humans
to interpret.
6.2 Explainable Autonomy
Another branch of related work involves explanation generation. Systems that explain their internal
motivations and justify their actions are not new (Doyle et al., 2003; Sørmo et al., 2005). The
case-based reasoning community has a rich history of building such systems. One early work
described a system that provides external explanations of how it designed physical devices (Goel
& Murdock, 1996). This work used meta-cases that store a trace of the cognitive processing done
during problem solving. These meta-cases could be retrieved to explain to a user the reasoning
behind the agent’s design choices. There are several differences between these systems and the
extended ICARUS. First, our work describes a domain independent episodic memory that is not
limited to handle only the agent’s design choices for physical devices. Second, our work integrates
the episodic memory inside a cognitive architecture. Third, the plans the system generated, which
can be viewed as internal explanations, are repurposed into external, text-based explanations that
people can consume. Fourth, explanatory ability is encapsulated inside skills, which are more
similar to goal-task network formalisms (Alford et al., 2016).
Recently, there have been efforts to explain black box algorithms. Turner (2016) created a
system that generates Boolean statements to explain black box classifiers. Given an input vector,
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the system would output a statement defined on the input feature space that explained the class
assignment of the input. The system takes a Monte Carlo approach to understand the characteristics
of the underlying classifier. Unlike decision trees, it only explains the model working in individual
input cases, but not how the system works in general. The work is limited to classifiers and does
not provide any information on what features the input should have to obtain different classification
result. In contrast, we focus on building a system that that explains extended behavior, not just the
properties of the input that led to certain outputs.
Furthermore, there has been a push towards building explainable machine learning systems
(Aha et al., 2017). Although there is a heavy focus in machine learning, there are a few model-
based systems that address the issue of explainable artificial intelligence. Fox et al. (2017) discuss
why model-based planning systems need to have explainable components. They cite people’s
growing need to collaborate with intelligent agents, and describe properties of explanations, such
as causality, that help human users understand why actions were taken. Although this work is
philosophically in line with ours, it lacks theoretical postulates for explainability, and the authors
do not provide an implementation of a planning system with the explainable qualities they discuss.
Furthermore, it seems that the authors assume that the end user asks questions about the planner’s
current plan, but not those plans that were executed in the past. In contrast, our theory of explain-
ability relies heavily on episodic memory, and ICARUS agents are able to explain behaviors that
occurred in their personal past.
In robotics, researchers developed a robotic system that can explain its decisions when design-
ing new tools (Wicaksono & Sheh, 2017). The system uses relational models to describe the tools
and can learn how to use tools via inductive logic programming. The robot is capable of explain-
ing why or why not the system makes certain decisions. States are represented in an abstract,
relational manner similar to the concepts in ICARUS, and actions are represented as STRIPS oper-
ators. Additionally, the authors gave the system an ontology of tools, which is used as a case base
for modifying and creating new tools. The system demonstrates explainable behavior by storing
its plans for achieving goals in what is essentially an episodic memory of their own for storing
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the agent’s plans. It, however, seems to be specialized to tool creation and use, and the system
only supports answering questions about its external behavior, not its choice of specific goals.
Furthermore, the agent’s actions are not discussed in relation to the goals they achieve, so it will
be difficult for human users to understand the agent behavior without prior understanding of the
application domain.
Johnson’s (1994) Debrief system is perhaps most similar to our work. The authors present
Debrief, a system that explains its behavior to a user in an after-action interview. The system
includes an episodic memory and integrates it within the Soar cognitive architecture. The agent
stores the plans it creates, and is able to recall the plans to generate an explanation. The system
can answer questions about what it did, as well as provide details about what it could have done.
Nonetheless, the work makes few theoretical commitments to episodic memory representations
and processes, providing little details about when and how episodes are constructed, or how they
are organized in memory. Furthermore, Debrief requires a specification of what state elements
are relevant for explanations. ICARUS’ episodic memory does not need such specifications and is





Now that we have presented our theoretical position on the role of episodic memory in explainable
autonomy and shown how the theory can be implemented, we propose a research agenda that can
guide our efforts for further progress. First, we would like to enable the system to summarize
multiple episodes into one explanation. We showed that the system can abstract away low-level
details when describing how it killed a zombie. So, to some extent, our agent can already explain
its behavior in an abstract manner, but we want our system to have the ability to synthesize its
history into summaries. Much like the way humans tell stories, we want our systems to be able
to tell users stories about the events they experience. For example, when a user tasks an agent to
complete a task, the user may initially be interested in “what happened”. In such scenarios, the
system should be able to retrieve a series of episodes from the episodic memory and weave their
components together to explain large segments of time. In other words, it should extend the current
system by integrating multiple agent intentions and plans into one explanation.
Second, we would like to build multiple, cooperating agents that share their experiences through
one episodic memory. Since one agent’s experiences would affect all agents sharing that memory,
we wonder how learning and performance in multi-agent domains would be affected by shared
episodic memories. In one scenario, we envision a team of agents acting to achieve a joint goal.
We also would like to observe how the quality of learned knowledge is affected when multiple
agents start learning asynchronously.
Third, in this work we showed that our system is able to explain its rationale for why it takes
action. In addition to this, we would like our system to adapt to user preferences by adhering to
feedback. In general this is a difficult endeavor, since an agent will likely need meta-cognitive
38
ability to control how it thinks about its own behavior. One plausible next step, however, is to
model inverse trust as done by Floyd et al. (2014). In this way, the system can estimate if users
believe it is a trustworthy agent.
Fourth, although our system can infer beliefs about the mental state of others, through per-
ceptual questions, we did not talk very deeply about shared mental models (Mathieu et al., 2000;
Jonker et al., 2011). In the future, we would like our system to be able to use shared mental models
for demonstrating explainable behavior. Constructing a good explanation not only depends on hav-
ing methods for responding to questions, but also on the human-agent dyad’s understanding of the
question being asked. This means that an agent should be able to reason about what information
would be most relevant to satisfying the user’s goals.
Fifth, we would like to partner with cognitive scientists and psychologists to evaluate these
agents in human-robot teams. We would like to understand how humans perceive the quality of the
explanations of the system, and also we would like to understand how humans try to structure the
agent’s experiences so it learns desirable behavior. These human subject tests are valuable because
even in communities that have historically focused on generating explanations for humans, very
few of them have actually verified the quality of their explanations with humans (Doyle et al.,
2003; Sørmo et al., 2005).
Sixth, we desire systems that can remember and talk about their experiences at different levels
of detail. Those interested in creating episodic memory systems ought to consider the scalability
of their approaches. Creating systems that scale usually is not the most important consideration
in research, but in the case of episodic memory, scalability is an important issue because only
episodic memory systems that scale can attempt to solve problems that require the agent to ex-
ist for extended periods of time. To achieve scalable systems, we want to consider innovative
episodic memory organizational schemes as well as examine established strategies, such as the use
of hierarchy.
Finally, We also consider ethical aspects of explainable autonomy. If current trends continue,
AI will fundamentally pervade our personal and societal lives. We argue that existing in a society
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with other intelligent agents that humans can interact with and understand is far more desirable
than living with artificial systems that are shallow reproductions of human behavior. This issue
is even more complicated for collaborative agents built from machine learning technology. These
agents will encourage people to attribute to them goals, intentions, and beliefs, when in actuality
they possess none of these things. They portray an image of themselves that does not reflect
reality. They can come across as open and inviting, but are no less impenetrable than other machine
learning-based systems. So, our final thought is to attempt to actively represent the cognitive




There has been a widespread acceptance of artificial intelligence techniques in many different
applications, but the continued growth of the field will be limited if as humans cannot understand,
trust, and properly manage autonomous systems. The state of the art in artificial intelligence
has produced systems with incredible performative ability, but often by inducing opaque, non-
intuitive decision functions that humans cannot interpret. This makes these systems black boxes,
for which humans cannot predict when they will make mistakes or successfully achieve its end.
Episodic memory provides key insights into this problem by providing a window into the internal
decision-making processes of intelligent agents. In this thesis, we discussed how episodic memory
in cognitive systems plays an important role in constructing intelligent agents that can explain their
behavior to their human counterparts.
The cognitive systems approach has received less attention in the context of explainable auton-
omy, but we believe that the paradigm makes it possible to build integrated systems that humans
can understand and collaborate with. In this thesis we showed evidence that suggests that reason-
ing over episodic memory contents allows an agent to explain its behavior using constructs, like
goals and intentions that humans readily understand.
Our work also described a series of behavioral aspects, namely the abilities to summarize
events, answer questions, and engage in hypothetical reasoning that enable agents to demonstrate
explainable behavior using episodic memory. We also implemented this theory in the context of
the ICARUS cognitive architecture and built an agent that demonstrates those capabilities in the
game of Minecraft. Our results suggest that systems with episodic memory can answer a variety
of questions about their decision-making process.
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We also provided our thoughts on promising directions that could yield new insights into ex-
plainability and sought to begin a conversation about the challenges facing work on explainable
agents in both technical and ethical perspectives. In closing, we found that episodic memory en-
ables computational agents to explain their internal and external experiences. As we enter a new
age of artificial intelligence, explainability will be essential for fostering a harmonious integra-
tion of intelligent agents in our society. Episodic memory is a fundamental component of human
cognitive ability, and our extended architecture serves as an important basis for future research.
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